

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SANAA 01378 041521Z

46

ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03 SP-02

INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 /045 W
----- 046850

R 041250Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY SANAA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5648

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

S E C R E T SANA 1378

LIMDIS

NOFORN

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PINS, PFOR, MU, YS, KU

SUBJECT: DHOFAR WAR AND PDRY-PERSPECTIVE FROM NORTH YEMEN

REF: MUSCAT 585; KUWAIT 2208; ABU DHABI 1191

BEGIN SUMMARY: WE DOUBT FEASIBILITY OF CARROT VS STICK
APPROACH IN INFLUENCING PDRY'S DEDICATED REVOLUTIONARIES.

INSTEAD WE PROPOSE "SHIELD" POLICY OF CONCENTRATING ON

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SANAA 01378 041521Z

STRENGTHENING YAR AND OMAN. END SUMMARY.

1. DHOFAR WAS IN PSYCHOLOGICALLY SOMEWHAT REMOTE FROM NORTH YEMEN. PDRY ITSELF, HOWEVER, IS MATTER OF GREATEST CONCERN TO YARG. WE WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO ADD A FEW THOUGHTS ON SUBJECT FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE AND FROM OUR FREQUENT TALKS WITH FONMIN ASNAG, AN ASTUTE THOUGHTFUL ADENI EXILE WITH CONTINUED ACCESS TO THE SOUTH THROUGH FAMILY AND INTELLIGENCE CONTACTS.

2. PDRY PROBLEM IS GENERALLY THOUGHT OF AS CARROT VS STICK PROBLEM. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THIS REFLECTS AMERICAN PROPENSITY TO CONCEPTUALIZE PROBLEM IN TERMS FOR WHICH WE CAN PROPOSE RELATIVELY CLEAR SOLUTION. IN FACT WE DOUBT WHETHER, IN PDRY'S EYES, CARROT IS THAT TASTY OR STICK THAT TRUSTY. SAG ATTEMPTS TO FIND MILITARY SOLUTION THROUGH VARIOUS EXILE GROUPS (SAL, NUF) HAVE PREDICTABLY DONE LITTLE MORE THAN TO MUTE INTERNAL RIVALRIES IN PDRY. RECENT SAG ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL SWEETENER IN ORDER TO MODERATE PDRY HAVE HAD IN OUR VIEW NO NOTICEABLE RESULT OTHER THAN TO EASE PDRY'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS.

3. SIMILARLY IT STRIKES US THAT KUWAITI POLICY OF BEING KINED TO PDRY IN HOPES THAT LATTER WILL BEHAVE BETTER IS CASE OF MAKING VIRTUE OF NECESSITY, I.E. HOPE TO AVOID WRATH OF RADICALS BEING DIRECTED AGAINST MILITARILY WEAK AND INTERNALLY VULNERABLE KUWAIT.

4. RATHER THAN CARROT OR STICK, WE WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE ANOTHER SYMBOL--THE SHIELD. THIS DERIVES FROM OUR FIRST ASSUMPTION--THAT PDRY IS IN HANDS OF DEDICATED MARXIST REVOLUTIONARIES WHO WILL NOT SELL THEMSELVES OUR FOR "MESS OF POTTAGE", ESPECIALLY WHEN SAG TERMS WOULD MEAN END OF THEIR MARXIST POLITY. EVEN IF SALIM RUBAYYI ALI COULD BE CONVINCED TO SWITCH, WE HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS THAT HE COULD WIN CONFRONTATION WITH ABD AL-FATTAH ISMAIL AND OTHER SINGLE-MINDED FANATICS. IN MEANTIME WE EXPECT THAT PDRY WILL MAKE PRIVATE NOISES HINTING AT MODERATION AS LONG AS THIS WILL MEAN MORE SAUDI AND UAE CASH PAYMENTS, BUT WILL NOT TAKE ANY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SANAA 01378 041521Z

MEANINGFUL STEPS IN THAT DIRECTION.

5. FOCUS OF EFFORT AS WE SEE IT SHOULD BE TO BUILD UP DEFENSIVE STRENGTH OF NORTH YEMEN AND OMAN BOTH BY MILITARY CUM SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND BY ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO HELP TWO COUNTRIES DEVELOP RAPIDLY AND KEEP POLITICALLY MODERATE GOVERNMENTS. THIS IS WHAT IS HAPPENING IN NORTY YEMEN, ALTHOUGH

PROFERRED SAG MILITARY AID HAS BEEN FAR TOO SLOW.

6. AT RISK OF USING IMPRECISE AND SOMEWHAT EMOTION-LADEN ANALOGY, IT SEEMS TO US THAT THIS IS POLICY USG PURSUED WITH MEASURABLE SUCCESS IN CUBA. FACT THAT TIMES NOW SEEM TO CALL FOR DIFFERENT APPROACH IN CUBA DOES NOT DETRACT FROM EFFECTIVENESS PAST POLICY IN WHICH WE MANAGED TO ISOLATE VIRUS OF CUBAN REVOLUTIONISM FROM POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE COUNTRIES SUCH AS VENEZUELA.

7. THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO GUARANTEE THAT PDRY WILL MODERATE OVER TIME, BUT THERE IS AT LEAST REASOBABLE CHANCE THAT THIS WILL HAPPEN. THERE IS NO REASON THAT EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, OR KUWAIT, ET AL., SHOULD NOT KEEP UP EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH PDRY, BUT EXPENDITURES OF CASH ASSISTANCE IN RETURN FOR VAGUE PROMISES STRIKE US AS NAIVE. ASNAG HIMSELF WHO HAS DISPLAYED REALISTIC DEEP SKEPTICISM ABOUT PDRY INTENTIONS HAS URGED STRONGLY THAT ARAB AID TO PDRY BE LIMITED TO PROJECT ASSISTANCE WHOSE REQUIRED LEAD TIME COULD BE USED TO TEST PDRY GOOD INTENTIONS. USG CAN SIMILARLY RESPOND TO ANY PDRY DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, BUT SHOULD NOT TAKE INITIATIVE TO COURT PDRY AND SHOULD CONSULT PARTICULARLY WITH SAG AND YARG BEFORE MAKING RESPONSE.

8. OUR SECOND ASSUMPTION IS THAT PDRY CAN POSE NO VERY GREAT THREAT OUTSIDE ITS BORDERS, IF NORTH YEMEN AND OMAN ARE PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY RICH NEIGHBORS. NORTH YEMEN WITH SIX AND HALF MILLION CITIZENS, OF WHOM ONE MILLION ARE WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA, AND WHICH HAS COMMON BORDER WITH ETHNICALLY YEMENI HEAVILY POPULATED SAUDI PROVINCE OF ASIR IS POTENTIALLY MUCH MORE DANGEROUS SHOULD IT TURN RADICAL. EMBASSY KUWAIT'S POINT THAT DHOFAR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SANAA 01378 041521Z

REBELS WILL WIN IF THEY DO NOT LOSE IS WELL TAKEN. NEVERTHELESS INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WILL LOSE UNLESS PDRY TAKES MORE ACTIVE ROLE. LATTER MAY WELL DO SO BUT IN OUR VIEW MUST CONSIDER POSSIBILITY FORCEFUL COUNTER-RESPONSE FROM IRAN AND PERHAPS SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD THIS OCCUR. FINANCIAL DRAIN ON OMAN IS ALSO QUESTION, BUT IT CERTAINLY FEASIBLE FOR SAUDI ARABIA TO BEAR GREATER SHARE OF COST, ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY, IF CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT.

9. IN SHORT WE SEE NO SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR ANYONE TO INFLUENCE SIGNIFICANTLY PDRY LEADERSHIP SHORT OF ALL-OUT WAR. FOCUS SHOULD BE TO PROTECT FAR MORE IMPORTANT STATES OF NORTH YEMEN AND OMAN WHICH ARE DIRECT NEIGHBORS OF POPULATED AREAS OF OIL-RICH STATES. THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CONTINUING ISOLATION

OF PDRY AND WOULD MINIMIZE HARM IT COULD DO. EVENTUALLY,
AS EMBASSY ABU DHABI ALSO SUGGESTS, PDRY'S REVOLUTIONARY
JUICES MAY TURN TO BILE. AT MINIMUM
WE AND OUR FRIENDS WOULD AT LEAST HAVE AVOIDED UNWISE
EFFORTS WHICH WOULD ONLY STRENGTHEN RADICAL HOLD ON PDRY.
SCOTES

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COMBAT OPERATIONS, DHOFAR WAR, POLITICAL SITUATION, MILITARY PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 04 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975SANAA01378
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750195-0634
From: SANAA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750681/aaaacwhh.tel
Line Count: 175
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 75 MUSCAT 585, 75 KUWAIT 2208, 75 ABU DHABI 1191
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 JUN 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <17 JUN 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DHOFAR WAR AND PDRY-PERSPECTIVE FROM NORTH YEMEN
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PFOR, MU, YS, KU
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006